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Tape Vi, pl 
A continuation of Tape V: persons present, site, and time - same. 
RT - So it seems there would have been three more out of this group voting toda:, 
for Article III. 
CB - Rails, did you vote against III? 
TR - Certainly. 
CB - And you haven't changed your mind? 
TR - No. 
RT - I want to go ahead rith that coalition thing, for I am afraid I left it 
dangling and it might be the vrong conclusion. I think that the function 
of the group was tremendously important; however, I think it might be 
more likened to a confederation, as the United States was before it became 
a federal group. There was really no effort, as I saw it, to bind any one. 
CB - No loss of individual sovereignty. 
TR - I was just taking so~e license to threaten with "fragile." 
CB - I am not sure you did not head off a lot of other screwball ideas and 
groups. 
TR - That is waht I mean. I thought they would drag ot.,t eve:r,rthi..~ and that 
really could hurt some of us in trying to sell articles I and II to other 
Republicans. 
CB - Right. 
TR - It was a simple as that. 
WC - Tom, I fou.,d that reference in rrry notes: "I would li.\ce to poi:rt. cut 
initially that regardless whether this article passes or fails, I want 
to make it clear this member of that fragile coalition inter.ds to remain 
firm in his adherence to articles I and II." 
TR - Yeah. 
WF - It is good that this dissociates yourself from Railsback at that point. · 
LAUGHI'ER. 
WC - At any point usu.ally. 
TR - I thought it was in respect to article rf, but it vasn 't, it ;,,as three. 
DS - Do you think Article III as such would have passed the House? 
WF - No. 
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TR - I doubt it. 
RT - After the later eveats, I thin.'< it :night have. I believe after the 23rd 
tape, if that had not been followed by resignation. 
CB - I thought about that since you asked me the other question the other day. 
I feel that' it would not have passed the House, because the pride of the 
Judiciary Committee was at stake when we passed article III thru the -
committee, but the pride of the House would not have been there, and for 
that reason I don't think the House would have had the same feeling. 
WF - Good point. It would .have made a difference whether the three of us would 
have been on the same side of it, too. I think if Jim and I had changed 
at that point, the southern Democrats :would have gone along with us. Don't 
you think so? If we hadn't , it would have been a divided thing. 
HF - Aren't we still talking about the possibility in terms of the House, that 
it might amend I and II ourselves to insert the essence of III? 
RT - Bill and I had agreed that if it came to the floor, we would make an 
effort to add article III to preferably I. 
HF - There is another thing that I noted in rrry talk about that article. I 
actually put the question to McClory. That we were still hoping that 
the President was coming across with the documents, the Supreme Court 
decision had made it seem perhaps that we would get some more subpoenaed 
material, then I asked, if we did, prior to going to the noor, get the 
response from the President to our subpoenas, would we then withdraw 
article III? And he said "Yes." 
WC - Ray, in my remarks to Article III, I said that even if the President 
stated reasons for his refusal to remply to our subpoenas, the evidence 
before the committee even before the releaseof the June 23, '72, transcripts, 
was more than sufficient to find the claim of executive privil · ege was 
illegitimately ar.d improperly L"'lVOked, not to protect the office of the 
President, but to protect the particular President from the disclosure 
of his personal participation in the obstruction of justice, accordingly 
the President's non-compliance with the subpoenas formed an integral 
part of Article I and possibly Article II, and rests mooe soundly there. 
TR - I agree. 
RT - I agree. 
WF - Don't you all think our colleagues in the House are due a great deal of 
credit - I am thinking provincially here, I admit, but even my Republi-
can colleagues from Alabama specilically avoided saying anything critical 
of what I was doing, and they were very strong Nixon fans, and their 
constituencies were. Even a right-winger like Bill Dickenson never 
stated anything like that. You all undoubtedly had about the same ex-
perience. They were unusually kind in terms o! the highly charged 
political atmosphere that we were operating in. 
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TR - The Republicans in the House, with about two or three exceptions, who 
were loud-mouthed reactionaries, were excellent. They didn't pressure, 
they listened, they kept an open mind, most of them. I was very impressed 
with our colleagues. With the exception of maybe ten guys I would think. 
WC - Let us not be so gracious. Don't forget abot.t the political pressure 
they were under. 
w'F - They didn't know, they didn't have the facts we did, and they were going 
to wrap themselves up in the cloak we did. 
HF - Among the moee conservative Republican House members, like John Ashbrook, 
who came out for impeachment a week or two before we voted. I remember 
the day of the Hogan press conference. Margery Hope told me very natly 
on the House floor that the entire Maryland delegation is goir..g to vote 
for impeachment. 
TR - Really! 
HF - We hadn't even voted. · So you had these very conservative people who 
must have had some •••• 
CB - That's the first time I heard that thing about the Maryland delegation. 
HF - And altho she was speaking specifically about Maryland, I asked what is 
the difference bwetween Maryland and anyplace else. 
WC - Would it be worthy to note what our reactions were to the Hogan announce-
ment? You know this article of ZiefJnan about the shirt !roll chickens to 
screaming eagles came about for a couple of members in a ver-y short period 
of time. Hogan's participation during the entire impeachment investigation 
really was on the negative side i::i. my opinion, and then suddenly a dramatic 
shift in one day, two days, into a strong advocate for i~eacrur.ent, When 
I was being interviewed about rrry reaction to Hogan's state:nem., I said 
it had no impact whatsoever, and I said nothing publicly, but privately 
dismissed it as a pure political r..ove, 
WF - That is exactly what I felt. 
TR - I have to differ with that. I think Larry Hogan was very, very much 
concerned about procedural saf~guards as everyone else. I think that 
all along he was considering the possibility of voting for impeachment. 
I do in fairness to him. 
CB - I think his statements indicated a grasp of the evidence. 
~ - Yes, very good. 
~r - He's a smart cookie, no questionabout that. 
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TR - I think he is a good lawyer. 
HF - But why did he have to go out front? What if the rest of us had done the 
same thing? 
TR - It was a political decision, no doubt, but I wouldn't say he made up his 
mind to vote for impeachment ju.st for a political reason. 
WF - He piled it up over here and piled it up over ther~, and he'd say to 
run for the governor of Maryland to support Richard Nixon ain't going 
to be worth a dime's worth of ink; if' I am going to run !or governor 
and announce to impeach Richard Nixon, I am going to be an instantaneous 
household word. 
TR - I don't think so. 
HF - That may be the analysis, but it was apparently an incorrect political 
decision, because he was rlll".ning i."'l the REpublican primary, not in the 
final election. 
WC - What impact did it have upon us as a group? Did it have any impact upon 
any of you then? 
CB - The impact was, as Railsback said, it took the heat off of us from that 
exposure by the Cannon article. 
WF - It momentarily diverted the press. 
CB - Yeah, that's right, which I think was salutary because it gave us a 
chance to concentrate a little on our own problems. 
WF - And we had us another vote that ·111e q_uite frankly hadn't counted on. 
Hogan was representative of the conservative element, that gave us a 
litlle bit more clout. I think we were looking for votes then. Give 
Hogan c::-edit. I didn't count on McClory until he didn't have a chance 
to change his vote. 
LAUGHTER. 
TR - On Article II, I still do not understand the sequence of the drafts. 
I think, Jim, maybe you and Tom can get together. That's too significant 
to pass by. 
DS - I think it is iIJl!=)ortant to do that, and perhaps they could get togther 
in Washington. 
JM - Yes, it's obvious that we did most of the coalition work on that Wednesday 
and kind of agreed on general perameters and then after McClcry got 
involved, we changed a little language. 
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TR - Of course we wanted him involved. 
HF - Will Dear be able to help us out there? 
TM - We intend to interview him in the r.ext few weeks. 
WF - Incidentally, on Dear - I arranged rith him to go to make a lobbying 
speech in Birmingham, Alabama, to about 400 blue ribbon, fat cat lawyers, 
two-thi.i! of whom Iain sure were card-carrying Republicans. And he made 
the damndest speech. Of course I was in the audience. He included every-
body, and he gives the conanittee all the credit, and he, John Dear, was 
just there to help us develop the facts and he likened us almost to 
saving the Constitution, to the guys that wrote it. Now he may have gone 
a little bit too far, but I recommend him to any of you to make a good 
speech. 
HF - Does he come across negatively at all? 
WF - Not at all. He comes across as a decent guy who isn't very colorful. 
TR - A decent guy. 
:OS - Cow.d we get a copy of that speech, because here is a public statement 
about the coalition by Dear. I would like to get that before we see him. 
WF - I think we surely could. You also ought to get Jenner's public statement 
about the committee. Tom, remind me to write to JohnDoar when we get 
back to Washington, and I am sure he'll send me a copy. 
TM - Fine. We might also ask for an interview with him in New York. 
WF - Good. 
DS - Isn't it true, that quite apart from the merits of article III, or whether 
it should have been with I or II, once this group had i.~ fact .rritten 
and gotten accepted the first two articles, the pressure was off? 
HF - Yes, the reason for that is that it goes back to the fact that this group 
had individually made up its mind on the basic, two-pronged approach that 
was embodied in I and II; that is what got us together in the first place. 
WF - Yeah, and do you know something else - now let's talk a little politics 
- we all didn't mind having someth.L91g to vote against. It wasn't very 
difficult to find a reason. It was easy to vote against IV and V, b~"t, 
man, here's another chance. Three was a farily good case either way, and 
to vote against it, I think, raised our credibility back home. Does 
anybody disagree rith that? 
\ 
Tape V, p6 
All - No. 
r:s - Walter, the point you made last night or this morning as you were serving 
your special Flowers drink: you said something to the effect that it was 
not really article I or article II, but rather you were voting for •••• 
TM - That was an incredible product. 
HF - ReferrL'l'lg to Flowers? 
r:s - I recommend him highly. 
HF - Him or his drink? Would you repeat that? 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - I think that even aside from th specifics of article I and II, at least 
in my o-m process, I might not be as eloquent as early this morning, I 
think we had gotten down to an even more basic choice. When we throw 
it all up into the air ar..d it comes down, I decided whether it was better 
for our system, for the future, to impeach Richard Nixon or not to. It 
was yes or no, not on this or that article or charge, it was yes or no 
for the continuation or improvement of our constitutional system: we help 
it or hurt it. It was just that simple. 
RT - So really maybe what we did in a few moments at the er..d of our months 
of discussion was to put wgrds down which allowed us to make that choice 
individually, without being concerned about havir.g to accept some things 
we didn't really believe in or had."l't been proven. It was a tremendously 
valuable thing that this group did, in putting words together that 
allowed us to make that ultimate choice, without being hampered by having 
words that we couldn't have lived with. 
TR - Let's don't leave it at words. I disagre a little bit, Walter, altho I 
must admit that I think what you are saying is certainly or.e of the 
factors in the whole equation, but. I think that we had to be convinced 
that there was L~deed clear and convincing evider.ce of some serious 
offenses. 
RT - AbsolutelJl. 
TR - W.e had to think they were serious enough to cause us to depose Richard 
Nixon for the good of the country. 
WF - What I mean is you would not have given a damn about the abuse of the ms 
if you didn't think it would damage the system. 
RT - I think your point is extremely well made, and I would like to join you, 
because by using "words" I did not mean simply mechanical things. 
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JM - Let me engage in a little blasphemy here. You are getting very close to 
sayiag that each of us, much earlier than we have admitted to ourselves, 
had a feeling that Richard Nixon had to go, that the countrr, that our 
system could not tolerate the growth of power, the abuse of power, the 
double-dealing, the misrepreeentations of which we were aw-are in various 
areas of our government. It was not specifically these two items, and 
that it was somewhat fortuitous, poetic justice, or what not, that a set 
of circumstances presented themselves which permitted us toplay a role 
in his deposition. Now, as lawyers, however, we had the ability to not 
make that move without the evidence to support it. Now I vor.der if that 
doesn't express something that we can't admit even to ourselves? 
HF - As lawyers we had the ability to make that move? 
JM - No, as lawyers we had the ability to evaluate the evidence so that we would 
not effectuate our irmer feelings. 
WF - Cut the cloth to fit the pattern. 
JM - But not unless the evidence was there. And it was there. 
TR - I disagree. 
WF - I don't think I had made that judgment wuntil the evidence was there. 
That final judgment was a single decision that Richard Nixon had to go 
in order to preserve the system. That is the judgment I made, and then 
I cut the cloth. 
JM - I wouldn't say that arr:, of us made a conscious judgment 1:."!til the 
evidence was there. 
HF - My approach is a little bit different, and I think I took it more like 
Tom did, the evidence and then the judgment, and then I asked 111,Y'Self, 
what would be the ef.f ect of impeachment? Would the country be harmed 
by something that may be the right course of action? 
WF - But would you have then turned around and voted "No" if you had decided 
the country would be harmed by it? 
HF - I decided that the country would not be harmed. 
WF - But had you decided the other way? 
HF - I never reached that point. 
RT - Yes, To·m,you expressed something that I feel also, and that I had worried 
about early, that is, within the last two or three weeks or so before 
our vote and had e.xprressed a worcy- even earlier: what if this case 
should develop so that I should become convinced as a lalfYer that the 
evidence was sufficient to require a trial in the Senate in order to 
dispose of these charges, and yet I was not sure in my ovn mind that the 
result of that trial would lead to a conviction? What would happen if we 
were torn with the idea that we got to have a trial to clear the charges, 
but may not be able to get a convict.ion in the Senate? I worried a lot 
about that, but then I didn't have to make that choice. 
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HF - We all thought that through. That t.asn't our job, was it? 
RT - That's right. 
HF - It -was always a possibility. 
TR - What. we are showing right here now is that we each reached CU!' individual 
decisions differently, and there is nothing wrong with that. I made up 
m:,r mind, as I told Father Shea, after hearing John Dean give direct evidence 
of presidential involvement in what I thought was a very heinous offense 
as far as abuse of power. That influenced me, pl~ listening to Cates, 
and then taking that summary of information which for the fi:'st time, as 
far as I was personally concerned, pt....-t everything together so that I could 
form a judgment that the President had indeed lied to the American people, 
and that he had done certain other things that I thought were so serious 
at that point that he should be impeached,at least held to account by the 
Senate. That is what really motivated me. 
JM - My decision arrived 901, of the way during the time of the oral testimony-
of Dean, Kalmbach, and others, and then the summary helped bolster what 
was then a kind of an emotional feeling, but up until that time I had 
just absolutely refused to let ray ownself consider the possibility. 
WF - I refused myself the luxury of forming an opinion until all of it was in. 
And I way I thought about it, we travelled a long road in which there was 
a stop. .here and a stop there, and after the oral testimony-, that was it. 
You know, that was all of our evidence, but the summary was coming later, 
but in m::, own mind I looked back down the road and there were just too 
many bodies laying around. I didn't necessarily think about one thing 
or none of it; theee was just so dam.~ much there. There was so much 
smoke, there had to be that big, roaring inferno that we knew was there. 
HF - Did arr:r of you think during this process differentially between our task 
and the responsibility of the Senate? And of what would result in a 
failure of the Senate to convict? Did any of you thin.I{ of the possibility 
of being a manager on the part of the House? 
WC - Ham, let me go back to something. I came across in my notes something 
you probably won't recall. One time you and I were walking out of the 
Rayburn Building, and we were told, I think by Mike Waldman, that the 
Republicans had had a meeting, and I will get the date - we were not 
present at the caucus - where it was suggested that those Republicans 
should not support impeachment because it was not going to carry in the 
Senate and there would be two years of unmitigated hell for all those 
who voted for impeachment to pay, and then you quipped back to Mike at 
that point something to the effect, "Well, hell, you are looking at two 
of the prosecutors in the Senate right now." And Waldman said, "Can I 
quote you on that?" And you broke out in a big laugh. 
HF - We were standing in the horseshoe drive outside, getting into the car, 
and there was Sam Donaldson of ABC there also. I remember his expression 
when he said, "Can I quote you?" 
LAUGh"TER. 
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DS - Here is one the things that you disagreed on when we talked rith you in-
di vidually. Could there have been a case without the tapes? Now Mr. 
Mann just got thru saying the thing that was most convincing to him was 
the oral testimony and so on. Would you direct yoursel.-es to that? 
WC - Without the transcripts, all you had was John Dean versus Richard Nixon. 
TR - Yeah. I can speak to that. If we did not haTe the tapes, here is waht 
I think would have happened: the question of giving immunit7 to Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman and. other witnesses would have been raised. 
WF - Where <lid you get the evidence even for that? 
TR - I think we had Dean. 
WF - Oh, God! Evidence warranting immur.ity for Ehrlichman and rl.aldeman came 
from the tapes. 
WC - They lied in theSenate. Does it make any difference if they would now lie 
to us? 
TR - No, what I am saying is, I think it would have been a •rery difficult case 
frankly, but I think in asking that question, you have to assume that we 
would have conducted our inquiry much differently. You would have had the 
question whether to call other witnesses. 
WC - That is so removed from reality, in terms of what that co:mrittee would 
have done. 
TR - Well, it is a difficult question. 
WC - We did not do any investigation on our part. 
~ - I know that, we already had it. 
WC - But the point is, we were operating under time pressure. You may recall, 
we took the ·,ate - we had to get this thing over by April or May: "Come 
on, fellows, hurry up. You are dragging your heels on this." We were 
under tremendous pressure to conclude this, quote, as expeditiously as 
possible, and so if we had to conduct our own investigation •••• 
~ - I agree with you. 
WF - If you hadn't had the tapes, you vould never have had any inquiry. 
~ - That's right. 
'It? - There would neYer have been any Saturday Night Massacre. With no tapes, 
no one .,ould have gotten off the grou.."'ld. You would have had Drinan' s 
reolution flying around, that would have been it. 
:IF - I hadn't thought of the question that way. I thought you meant, if we 
hadn't the tapes, did we have enough evidence otherwise? But I see we 
might never have gotten to the initiation of the L'"lquiries. 
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JM - I said in my initial statemtn and I make it again: i! it hadn't been 
for the President's refusal to honor the Cox subpoena. he could have 
fired Cox and we still wouldn't have had impeachment, but the 48 hours 
of the fear that he was going to defy a court order, that had a hell 
of an effect upon me. And on the American people and on the press. 
That Monday morning was when all the resolutions were introduced and 
all the speeches were made up until 2:30 on Tuesday when he said he 
was releasing the tapes. It appeared that a President of the United 
States had so damn much power that he was goir.g to defy the courts of 
this country. 
WF - And he had so much to hide. 
JM - That is what gave the impetus to impeachment in m:, judgment. Had he 
not done that, we wouldn't have impeached him, and I certainly feel if 
it hadn't been for the tapes, we wouldn't have even come close. 
DS - It is true that this is a twe>-pror,.ged question, and really not a fair one. 
One is, would there even have been reason to have the case without the 
kickoff of the tapes; and two, once there is a case, were the tapes 
essential? So there are really two questions. 
CB - You got to assume that when you ask that question that our process is 
such that we couldn't ferret out wrong doing without the benefit of 
evesdropping by tapes and we do that all the time in criminal procedures. 
TR - I am not sure we could have here. 
WF - It would have been hard to prove a conspiracy. 
C3 - The only problem is triggering the i~vestigation, as you say, but if you 
set out to prove a case with this kind of information noatir.g around, 
we were clever enough to put it all together. 
WC - It is not a question of puttir.g it all together. You had people in the 
White House who did not give a damn about that oath. They would go into 
the Ser.ate and say, "Gee, I don't have acy recollection o~ that." That 
is the old stonewall that they went thru. And what do you do at that 
point? You had to have something with which to penetrate that stone-
wall and all those "I don't have any recollections." 
HF - We had 38 volumes of evidentiary presentation, and onl.7 19 tapes. There 
were so many documents from the White House. Just take the period of 
June 17, when independent of the tapes, what would you have? I assume 
that tapes do not include dictaphones. We had one dictaphone of the 
President's conversation on the second floor of the White House with 
Mitcaell, but you had the testimony and the statements made by the 
people of the Beverly Hills Hotel at breakfast the next morning and 
the phone call came and showed tha~ they knew what had happened the night 
before, and they were aware it was going to happen.[?] You had a 
lot of documentation as to the whole involvement of the CIA and the coverup 
was just starting. There were memoranda in the files of the CIA and 
Ehrlichman' s Iiles of the CIA that were given to the grand jury. 
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WF - You ain't got the President tho. You got everybody else. You got the 
pay-off, you got Hunt, you got Liddy, you got Bittman, O"Brien, you got 
all those birds, but yuu ain't got Richard Nixon . 
CB - Going back to what basically Bill said, those guys were tough enough to 
make up their minds that they were not going to tell the truth, and stick 
it out. But they are also tough enough that when they make up their 
minds that the ship is sinking and I had better get off - unload the 
whole way. And I just think in time this thing would have developed and 
come out. 
a 
TR - You need/credible, corroborated informer. 
WF - Another stoolie. 
WC - But we did not have the time. 
CB - What ·.do you think you could get out of John Ehrlich.man today if you promised 
himilmunity? You could get the whole God damned world. I don't know about 
Haldeman. 
WC - That is because he k.~ows you got the stuff. 
HF - Listen to him today - everything is peaches and cream - lovely people 
in the White House. 
WF - Ehrlichman is working for the Indians in New Merico or Arizona. 
CB - He figured out we hadn't fleeced the Indians a loo,( yet, but there must 
be some way. 
LAUGHER. 
DS - Un~er new areas for discussion, does anyone have acornment en t he kind 
of report that came from the Committee? 
WC - I had some complaints about it. : think my init::.al reaction was that it 
was handled like everything else - we got it at the last ll!Oment with 
about ~ or 48 hours to make our comments. And it was a document which 
couldn't even be read in that period of time. We had a very legitimate 
complaint on our part that we were always gettir.g thing at the last 
moment, am. without arr, real opportunity to have aey input. Yuu either 
take it or leave it. "Here it is, fellows, and you got to go with it." 
11ff - When ·-,as the final report filed? 
SL - August 20. 
'if'F - I don't think it matters. 
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WC - No, but we either had to subscribe to it or put some kind of statement, 
so we put a two or three line statement, saying that we agree with the 
thrust of it but don't agree with evecything in it, because Dear over-
reached in his report, in my opinion. He made statements that we could 
not subscribe to. 
TR - Sure he did. 
HF - "We agree in substance with this report, as it relates to those two 
articles; however, lest anyone infer that we agree rithout reeervation 
with every point made ,and given the lack of adequate time to prepare a 
detailed response to such points, ve state that we do not necessarily 
agree that there is clear and convincing evidence to support every con-
clusion in the report." That was signed by Railsback, Fish, Butler, 
and •••• [?] 
TM - Yeah, I remember running around drafting that and consulting with the 
people who did sign it. They were changing it all around and having fits 
trying to get that thing organized in time to file the report. 
TR - And again it involved I think imputation. 
WC - Even on article III, I remember I wrote my own views on three in about 
45 wknutes before they said, it is going to the press. 
TM - Mr. Railsback, you had some input on that report. Weren't you meeting 
with Rodino and others to talk about it? 
WC - Yeah, but we neve~ saw the results of it. 
TR - I don't think so. I think I was insisting that they have allegations 
that could be proved. 
TM - In the beginning you were saying, now I seem to recall, looki.r.g at the 
articles Dear drafted, that it was do~e in the same fashion - overstating, 
overreaching, and you [TR] were goir.g to try to :nake some effort to have 
some input in cutting back on that. 
DS - Were there an:, other qualifications or spcific~ about your reaction to the 
final report? 
SL - How many people have read the report? Mr. Fish brought up an important 
point before, that he voted against article III, yet filed views in favor 
of it, and yet no one has ever approached him about that. Isn't that 
right? 
WF - I don't think the reoort mattered ver.r much. 
HF - I think anyone who read the firs~ ~undred pages of that found it reads 
like a detective ~tory, and it reads very well - an absolutely convincing 
case on article I. But I don't think many people read it. 
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RT - If you want to justify the charges of history and get worryir.g about your 
individual opportunities, I think you are nattering yourself when you 
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took the time to set out the facts, and I am sorry that he did overshoot 
in many instances, but I think his greatest value is in terms of history • . 
It was a compilation of a record here that it was not an impeachment 
that was politically motivated, but justifed by the facts. And if the facts 
are a little bit fictitious, that strengthens it in value rather than 
hurts it. 
WC - But those opinions expressed are more important when you get the ten who 
voted against it, saying let's make it clear for history. 'lie did not 
drive Richard Nixon out of office. 
CB - Would you modify the use of the word "fictitious" and say "overdrawn"? 
RT - Overdrawn, overstated. 
DS - In your absence, Mr. Mann, there just for a moment, I asked the question, 
what were your reactions to the final report of the Committee, and Mooney 
says that you had some at the time. 
TM - He had a lot of input. I think he may have drafted it r 
RT- I had an input on the portion on article III. 
JM - I'm locking for the conclusion• of the report. 
RT - The original report language did not seem to me to sufficiently establish 
the theory that I tried to articulate, so it was necessary to correct it. 
TR - I' 11 tell you truthfully that I don't think that the final ::-epo?"t. had much 
to do with this coaltion. By then it was all over. 
CB - My view is the same. As far as I was concerned, I was sated with the whole 
business. 
'ilF - I was on the banquet circuit trying to explain what I done. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - I hadn't thought about my- next election until about June 27, late in the 
evening, and then I really did. 
DS - The second item here is - I ha--re only two very poor copies unfortunately 
- the Ju."le 28th letter of David Cennis, concernir.g ti!!.e five minute allow-
ance to all members to question witnesses. Did that play any part in your 
thinking or procedure then? 
RT - Not much. 
CB - I doubt if anybody paid acy atter.tion to it. 
DS - Rails had said just then he thought it affected none of your tactics or 
votes. 
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WC - It did ice, Tom. I did a hell of a lot more prenaration knowing that I was 
going to have a chance to get at those witnesses for five minutes. 
HF - As a coalition, it had no effect. 
WF - There was no coalition until way after this was an accomplished fact. On 
June 28 we weren't even together. 
WC - So not to our group, right, but as individuals, it did. 
TR - Oh, sure. 
ns - On either D or C, does anyone - again this is a!ter the fact - have a 
comment on the effect of your worlc on the system? 
WF - I don't think you could legislate that the Judiciary Cammi.tee be made up 
solely of lawyers; there is no constitutional requirement there. And I 
don't think that's necessary that you be a lawyer to do that. I think 
that it's helpful to have the kind of analytical mind that you develop 
in studying law. 
TR - That's the ~ay I feel. 
CB - Law is a discipline. 
TR - It is an understanding of the prerequisites necessary to return an indict-
ment, in other words, the standards. It helps with legalisms. 
WC - It helps with the restraint also. You may recall that your opponents back 
home are all saying, let's get this thing over to the Senate to a quick 
trial, and we are all holding back. We are always saying, "How wait a 
minute·, before we ever get this there, we have a lot of !"estraints on 
this whole system." I think that came about as a result of our legal 
trainir.g. 
'hove 
CB - You say lawyers /\ naturally slew. 
WF - Drinan is a lawyer. 
LAUGffi'ER. 
HF - Did anybody think perhaps we were unwieldy vi.th 37 members of the Committee? 
That this could have been ha."'ldl.ed better by maybe an odd group of say 13 
lawyers'? 
TR. - Sure, I did. I thought it would have been better to have a small cormiittee. 
WC - I didn't. 
TR - I was wrong. 
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CB - It was .another one of those damn things that Peter Rodino slopped into 
that inade him look great, but it was, looking back on it, good that we 
had a full committee. 
TR - Sure, I think I was wrong. I was for having a leadership group - senior 
members only. 
WF - In other words, you [TR] were one up on us. 
WC - You know who complained against it? Liz Holtzman. 
WF - Because she wasn't one of the seniors. 
WC - She was the one who originally ra±sed the question, "I wanted to have 
the chance of an input here, ar.d otherwise you would have had that super 
committee." 
HF - I don't mean of the Judiciary Committee, but senior lawyers taken from 
the whole House. 
DS - A select coDJDittee. 
HF - Yes. 
TR - I think Jimmy Breslin is. right in his book, that it was better to leave it 
to a colllllittee that was aL-eady s~1ected, and would not be selected for ~"'TY 
biases they may have. 
CB- Should be a standing committee. 
TR - An existir.g committee 'A'as l ~kely to be packed. 
WF - That was the beautiful thing about our committee. 
TR - Breslin said that if you had a special ad hoc committee you would not have 
the Butlers and the Railsbacks. 
CB - I knew there was a redeeming feature of that book. 
LAUGm'ER. 
WC - Take a look at the structure of the CIA committee in terms of how they 
packed it to relect the philosophies. The truth of the matter is that the 
Judiciary Committee had never been a really prestigious committee to be 
serving on traditionally. 
TR - I disagree with that. 
WC - OK. I spoke with John Mitchell one ti~~ and he said, how cc:ne you 
ended up on Judicia.."7? I said I wa.'lted to serve on it. 
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TR - Well sure, he's in jail. 
WC - He said when he was in the A.G.'s office, he had to twist a.MlS to get 
members coming in to serre on that committee, because ur.der tte leadership 
of Manny Cellars it really wasn't all that interesting to serve on. 
TR - I disagree. I certainl7 wouldn't switch. 
HF - That is because Manny Cellars kep the good stuff for his subcommittee, . 
you can bet on that. He packed a lot of power. 
we - I wouldn't change either. 
TM - There are periods ar.d trends in this. When the committee was working on 
the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it had the nation's focus, and it was de-
veloping a lot of controversy. It wasn't a prestigious cormittee, tho. 
However, it is a committee which has a lot of tough political issues, 
the death penalty, abortion, amnesty, gun control, and down the whole list. 
WF - You get the nuts and bolts, you don't get to authorize ~--ry- 1C0ney. It is 
a whole lot of tough issues. They might not get you any votes. 
RT - It was not at all my first choice, and I was frustrated L~ not getting 
my first choice of col!lllittee assigr..ments, and after I failed to get on 
the appropriations committee, Wilbur Mills called me and said, "Well, 
Judiciary is a nice quiet committee. You get on there and serve and get 
some experience." 
U.UGHTER. 
',{C - That's good! Ray, here's how I got on the Judiciary Cormri. ttee. This is 
the Harvard influence. I went to that special course they had, an ex-
perimental one for freshman Congressmen in 1972. There we~e four of 
us, Barbara Jordan, Ivonne Burke and [? ] and myself. Ar.d one of the 
people there told me that in selecting committees, what you really should 
do if you want to get on a commmittee of your choice is to put all the 
ether ones first, and the one you really want last. Because they think 
if you want that one first, it is for some ulterior · motive, and they will 
check you out too close, and you won't make it. I put appropriations, 
ways and means, armed services, a.'1.d judiciary last, hopir.g ti:e strategy 
would work. 
CB - Same as in World War II - Mr. Roberts. 
JM - Let me make one statement here for the group that I ma.de privately. I was 
not satisfied that the drafting ability of the impeachment staff was enough 
to write an appropriate summary or conclusion to article II on the abuse 
cf power. I thought it should be done philosophically ar.d so forth, and 
when expressing that opinion to John Doar, we agreed to call Phil Kurland, 
the professor at the University of Chicago, one of the constitutional 
lawyers of national repute. John Dear seemed to think he was a bet~er 
man for the job t~"l Berger or Tom Bickel or Tom Atchinson[?] from Yale. 
So I called Phil Kurland, but he was just leaving for his home in the 
north woods up in Michigan, and he said he just couldn't do it. So then 
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JM - I called rrI',f son, who was finishing his Ph.D. in South Carolina in English, 
creative writing, and I had him fly up at rrr:, expense and he and I 
wroked very vigorously for several days, along rith a ·girl by the name 
of Mary - some girl he[?] brought down from New York. We produced 
that conclusion to article II. 
TR - Interestir.g. 
DS - Was it significant that your son's degree was in creative ..-riting? 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - Jim injected a little note of nepotism. 
JM - Except that I paid all his expenses. He was very disappointed because 
when we sent it, it was a last minute deal, ar.d it came back from the 
G.P.O. kind of chopped up. But now glancing over ::.t, it may have been 
corrected, I couldn't tell just now whether the pa!"agraphs were trans-
posed. 
DS - Is there a possibility that there are two editions of the fir.al report? 
JM - Probably more than one printir.g. 
HF - The second printing, I think, is in two volumes. 
DS - I have an idea that they're simply called the same edition but as a 
matter of fact the secondir.g printing differed in some respects from 
the first. 
WF - Something we haven't talked about here was the flap we had over printing 
up this stuff in advance. We beat down a printing resolution, don't you 
remember that? What were they going to print? 
CB - 50,CCO copies of the te5timocy and - [?] copies of the evidence, 
somethir.g like that. 
WF - That was in advance of our activities. You are talki."lg about 50,000 
s~ts, whereas normally under the House rules it would be 20,CCO sets. 
JM - H. R. Gross has to be given credit for defeating that. 
WF - I think it was more us than Gross, wasn't it? We didn't want to be 
fanning the flarr.~s in the h.i .. ":terlands. 
~ - That's it exactly. 
CB - I would like to speak to part C for a while - our reaction at the 
dinner on Friday night, following the debate on the first article. 
We went down there and were eati.-.,g dinner, and I think we were on 
the verge of panicking there, and I am glad we held the line. I 
think stonewalling was the expression. I think that .Walter resolved 
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CB - on holding, on debating each one of those subparagraphs, and it turned 
out to be the best strategy - the best thing that we did, and it is 
another of those things that you just slop into as you come along. It 
surely worked out well. 
WF - We were being routed that day, I think. 
CB - What I wanted to know, who had a different viev'? 
I5 - The substantial difference, as I recall, was that there were several of 
you who felt that, no, the morale problem of the specificity issue was 
not as bas as all that, you were not on the verge of comir.g apart that 
much, that it was a much calmer sitation than others of you ir.dicated. 
WF - Well, I think that my morale problem was that we knew the minds and 
hearts or the people were being lost for our side, that we were losing 
the battle in the public forua, and you know it• s going to be a long 
time before it got elevated again to the ioc:)% Nielson rating. 
DS - One or the other of you went so !ar as to really wonder if tr.e thing 
was going to hold together at all. 
WC - My reaction to it was that after nine months •••• 
TR - Bill Cohen is kind of flaky. He was scared to death. 
WC - It wasn't flaky so much, but just disappointed at what was goi..--ig on. 
You had nine months of pregnancy and then you had the birth on tele-
vision, in which SAndman, who said nothing during the entire ni."le 
months, now was tearing us apart. Give me an example, give me a:. 
specific example, and not one word was coming out from us. I thought 
we lco~ed like hell. 
WF - We weee letting those other birds hand.le it, though, and I resolved there 
that the hell with that, let's take charge, we're the ones that had 
the political exposure, we were the ones that the American people were 
going to have confidence in, we were the guys that made the oojective 
decision, and we might as well go on to take charge. What the hell, 
it's just polities. 
WC - I do recall saying that night , "Look, I' 11 sta:, up all night if I have 
to, but I'll write the specif"ics for article I." And I went on to say 
how we were going to handle that whole thing. But I recall being just 
totally disgusted. Yeah, then you ca.me up with the specifics! [?] 
I recall that my react±on was one of anger that we got let down by the 
staff. 
CB - My reaction was one of terror, that we were going to collanse and were 
going to strangle ourselves over specification. 
DS - Right at the outset of that dinner, Tom [RJ, wasn't your first reaction 
to gi-ve in and say, in a certain sense, yes, we will list with the 
articles the various specifics? 
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TR - I don't know. 
CB - That was Cohen. 
TM - Yes, I think Railsback and Cohen both kind of favored that. I don't thin.le 
Mann had showed up there yet, or Flowers. There was a little panic there, 
because you [TR] were saying "get these down," and Cohen was always 
rattling off facts, and Railsback ~attling off facts, and they looked at 
me , "Mooney, you got that down?0 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - I thought, what the hell is going on? 
WF - Froelich was there too. 
TM' - Then you[?] said, "Damn it, we'll stay here all night if we have to, 
and we'll rewrite these articles and we'll put in the specifics, to wit, 
and you kept it up - to wit this and to wit~ .that, and write it down. 
People were running around, zcj 11; ng around. 
W'C - We had actually debated that night what we were going to do. We had to 
go back and face those cameras again. 
"n'F - That's right. That was a terrifying proposition. 
WC - It sure was. 
TR - We didn't give it up though. lie ju.st hung in there and we just decided 
that we knew enough about it to hang in there. 
TM - But there was some discU3sion about going to Rodino and say since it is 
8:00 on Friday, let it stay until Monday - give us a weekend to put it 
together. 
TR - I do remember that. 
C:S - He made us come back Saturday, didn't he? 
~T - I wasn't there for that dinner, but as I listened, it seems to me that a 
very significant metamorphosis was taking place right here, that the gro~ 
that had come into being in order to establish a focus on the issue was 
metamorphosing into an advocacy. 
'.if"F - Exactly. 
RT - This was what must have been lying the minds of those people who were there. 
I was working on some specifics myself at that tirr.e and I thir..k I didn't 
hear about the dinner, or I would have been there. But all of us were 
undergoing a transformation from deciding our views and working as a gro~l?" 
to get them down. 
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WF - But we could no longer stay in the background. 
WC - Look at our opening statements, even then they were condit~cr~l; it was 
wide open. 
CB - That's right. 
HF - Yes. 
WC - Whereas only a couple of days later, we were say~n.g •••• [?J 
It was more than just troubling us now. 
WF - But at that point we said, "Hell, man, let ' s us take charge. we can't 
let this thing go." 
TR - We didn't just keep it within the group. We made the mistake in my judgment 
of doling them out to people outside this group, a"ld I was very upset with 
Jerry Waldie' s litany of events, allegations, which again I thought went much 
too far. 
WF - But at the same time, though, Rails, Jim and Ray and I would :neet with 
the Democrats and they would say, "Hell, you guys are taldr.g charge 
you all are occupying all the prime time. You know, let us talk a 
little bit." 
TR - That's true. 
WF - They got very jealous of us doing all the talking. 
CB - Yeah. 
RT - We hadcome to be managers in a sense. 
WC - Well, the fact of the matter is, we knew it better than they did. 
P.F - ~hat's right. 
WC - Those that had made up their minds before didn't nave the k:.r.d of intensive 
factual knowledge that we did. 
HF - They hadn't had to focus on specific sections of the articles. 
JM - I made the remark yesterday that I had been chairman of the committee, 
this is when we were talking about Rodina's apparent objectivity, that 
I would have orchestrated that TV and planned and thought ahead the way 
htat ~iggins planned, a~d had a presen~ation reaay of layir.g out all 
the evidence. 
TR - You mean contrived? 
LAUGHTER. 
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WC - Rails had a smile on his face. 
7R - I did'? 
JM - That's exactly what I mean. But we all proceeded as individuals, thinking 
that we were engaging in some sort of debate, as we were calling it, and 
so when the issue arose, I reacted °b'J resenting the fact that here we were 
after ten weeks of analysis of the evidence, and now I have to answer our 
colleagues and tell them what the evidence is, and that was done as a 
political ploy, which of course it was, to mislead the American people. 
And that surely could be counteracted merely by pointing that out, which I 
did in one of rrr:, little chats with -- [?]. In spite of that, tho, it 
was obvious that we had to answer, so you recall we put the impeachment 
staff to work furiously on compiling mainly from the summary photocopy and 
putting them together as they applied to each one of the specifications 
and distributing them. But I never did get the idea or share Caldwell' s 
thought that we were in panic. Sure, we realized that we were losing 
ground, but not that we had to make any major change in our articles or 
our specifications or anything. That never crossed my mind. 
TR - Well, we had a couple of beers and the more cool we got •••• 
WF - Hell, we play this game all the time. We knew that we were losing the 
play, it was going badly for our team. 
wC - You had a jury out there, the people were trying the case. The D.A. or 
the defense counsel had you that time. 
WF - They were making the salient points. Here we were, we thought we were 
just going to be talking to each other and having to convince each other, 
but that wasn't what we were doing, we were playing to a national audience, 
the da.mndest national audience that had ever, ever been brought together. 
HF - 105 million people. 
iiF - We weren't ready for that aspect of it. 
CB - Let me mention a little history before we forget. We came back the next 
morning and had these amendments about policy and plan and things like 
that, and by the afternoon we had the information together for us, and 
then you [?] made your decision. We had a Republican caucus sometime 
along in the day. This was Saturday morning, and Ed Hutchinson and Wiggins 
were there, and I remember now they were sitting around and talking, 
"It will never hold up," "They haven't enough, but let's go i."l and vote." 
That was their attitude, you know: no substance to it, will never get thru 
the Senate. But let's vote. They were ready to vote. I tock that 
message back and by that time Walter really got his back up and the decision 
was made to go forward. But it was inteeesting that I think they felt 
like the7 had it right then. 
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WF - They wanted to vote so bad that I think they knew what was going on too; 
they were losing at that point. 
DS - On that Friday night, how long did it take to come to what vas ultimately 
the Flowers' procedure? 
JM - We didn't. 
WC - We didn't have a Flowers' procedure that night. 
JM - All we had was an understanding that we would compile the specii'ic evidence. 
CB - That night we expected that to be the Sandman procedu...-e. 
WC - And we went back saying, "Let's minimize as much as possible the amount of 
shelling we are getting from the other side"withthe notion that overnight 
the committee staff would come forvard with the material .. we would take on 
the attack the next day. But the best thing we could do was just try to 
hold the fort the rest of the night. That was the attitude. 
WF - But the rest of that night we did talk to the specifics of that 
subparagraph 8. 
JM - We had already received a little information from the staff. 
WF - That's right, and on Saturday we got into subparagraph B, and I think 
we turned the tide Friday night. It was too long, we talked too long to 
it, and we overdid. They did too, but by Saturday, the !irst thing 
off the bat, Sandman said, "I withdraw all my amendments.• That's 
when we moved forward into the breech there. 
RT - Walter, did you just take the initiative, did you just go ahead? 
WF - We had talked about it, and it was, I guess, my individual decision that 
it needed to be done, and you all support~d me in it, and of course at 
that point that was the wildest move - I was out. front then. It wasn't 
any more holding back, and I am t.!t-inking about these things. At that 
point I became an advocate, and I had decided, that was the heart-rendir.g 
decision there: "Flowers, if we want to impeach the President, let's do 
a good, clean job of it." That's .-hen we jumped. in and started chartering 
the thing, and it just turned around, I thir.Jc, to where we were totally 
the aggressors, we had total control, we were in charge. It was just a 
matter when we were going to put the coup de ~ace on it, 
C~ - That's the point I wanted to make. ~ think that was a fortuitous 
decision and it worked out very well. 
DS - Now I wonder if we could possibly shift gears right now, since Rails is 
going to have to leave soon for a gol~ing appointment with the governor? 
EF - So what's new? 
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:OS - I think there is a kind of consensus among you that you might want to 
leave tomorrow morning free, so I vonder if we could address ourselves 
to the pragmatic question that we ought to ask each other: where do we go 
from here? Because this may be the last meeting of your historic group, 
and I think we ought to consider a few points and options. I'll begin 
by giving the two obvious options. One, that it be tota.l.ly record, that 
it be transcribed, locked up, period. That is really the way I began. 
Or second, that in some fashion or other, you think of publishing. Then 
of course are the further subquestions of who, format, and so forth. 
Now let me assure all of you, as I have told a couple of you individually, 
and I very much mean it, that Tom and Steve and I have no axes to grind. 
We have nothing to sell you. So I am going to leave it open purposely, 
to use the inductive method, and what comes out _of this, comes out. Now 
I know, Tom, you have something to say. 
TR - Well, it seems to me that a proper thing to do would be consider having 
a bock. And if we do that, I can see us having an introduction, having 
a chapter on each of us, uing our first interview, rea.l.ly leading up 
to where we came together, and then having some · . of the book dedicated 
to where and after we came together. What do you do? Who writes it? 
Do we writeit or do we get a professional? I had a chance, for instance, 
to talk to Tony Lucas, who is a good friend of min• §r.d who ;nterviewed 
me and Ham about impeachment, and who covered impeachment, who is a 
Pulitzer Prize winner, for the New York Times, and ve'!7, very well known 
and highly regarded. He expressed a real interest in helping us for a 
piece of the action. I just happened to see Mike Waldman, the Newsday 
guy, and I just mentioned to him that we were meetir.g, and he was very 
interested. In other words, I think that this thing perhaps could be 
so authentic and so historical that it could be really a very worthwhile 
thir.g. Whether it would ever sell is another thing. Father, I would be 
happy if you would be interested in doing it. But the nigr.t before we 
came down here I called an agent wr:.o is in charge of Woodward and Bern-
stein and many other people who were speaking. I happend to have him 
too, before I lost my damn voice. But a very savvy guy who mentioned to 
me one time that he is a friend of Dave Obst, the guy that negotiated for 
Woodward and Bernstein, and advanced and put it together. I told him who 
I was meetL,g with, and who they guys are, and he was ver<J interested. 
But this guy said that he would c-11 Obst and just d~scuss ~~ with him ar.d 
personally I think that we ought to at least consider carefully inquiring 
into all the potential alternatives, and even talking to some people about 
the possibilities. In other words, I don't have anything concrete, but 
a lot o expressions of interest. 
CB - I don't understand - are you all going to pull all this together in 
some kind of sequence? 
DS- Yes, I . should have included that in cy opening remarks. I ;.ould like 
all of you to correct the transcripts we gave you of your individual 
interviews, and gi va them back to us, so that they say what you meant. 
Then you will get, I hope in relatively short order, transcripts of 
these few days, and again I hope all of you will do the same thing and 
go thru them and return them to us - to Tom Mooney's office. 
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WC - Do you think it would beneficial if after we correct our versions of 
our tape that we share them with the other members? 
D.5 - Perhaps not quite yet, so that not too many copies a....-e floating around. 
CB - After we get it back, then what are you going to do ·.nth it ultimately? 
DS - When I came to this project in February, and then en the 7th of May when 
we met for lunch, my frank impression was that whe:1 we got thru with todp.y, 
it would locked up. So I would feel perfectly content and not at all 
disappointed if nothing else happened to the corrected transcripts. But 
I want · to be frank that among the three of us, the:::-e is some disagree-
ment. Steve feels differently, in other worss, that this should go on, 
so we may take different views on this. My view is that I frankly don't 
care. I am an historian; I think the historical record is essential. 
I'll give myself a little compliment and say that I think what I've done 
so far has gone well, but I am not competent to write a best seller, a 
journalistic sort of thing, that just ain't my area. And I know this. 
Plus the fact of the time factor: in six weeks I am going to be teaching 
full time again at St. Joseph's College, and this is not going to be a 
half-time job for whoever puts it together. This is a major job. And I 
am just not going to have the time to devote to this pr,oject. I' 11 be 
most w:i11ing to help anyone to. Meanwhile, I am going to get the trans-
cripts ready for you by the time you return next month. 
TR - Father, after we correct and edit, I personally thi. ..... 'ic you ought to be 
able to do with it whatever you want. I think what .e are discussing 
also is whether we want to take part in it. It could be a very, very 
worthwhile thing. ilhether it would sell, I don't know, but I do know 
this, there is interest. 
WC - I would li.~e to direct myself to that, because, Tom, most of the members 
know . that I had given strong consideration to -..rit~ng a book myself, 
just about my mm participation, how I got there, what I perceived to be 
the tr.Ith, and so forth. I had agreed to do a book with Jim Naughton 
who I think is one of the finest writers in Washi.'1gton, and who had 
covered the Watergate thing from the Senate side ar.d our side and is 
really a gifted writer. We had written five or six chapters actually, 
and I submitted it to a number of publications. I had a lot of 
reservations about this - the timing, and the market is so glutted 
!'"ight now with a lot of junk. Frankly, I had given strong consideration 
of not doing anything for several years, ten years, just waiting and 
going back and doing it from my- own notes. And so we just kind of 
pursued this on an experimental basis, let us write something and see 
if there is any interest out ther-e. We contacted most of the major 
outfits, and I talked to David Obst specifically myself, and he said, 
"Look, ·it' sa great idea, but !'rankly there is no interest in it. The 
market is filled rght now." Woodward and Bernstein coming out, Nixon' s 
last hundred days, Sam Dash is trying to write a book. "It isn't going 
to make it." And I talked to Simon and Shuster, Ferrar Strauss, Little 
Brown, and all said the same things: great material, but we don't think 
it will sell, and we don't want to make any investment." Frankly, I 
think it is just as well it came out that way, I think this has all got 
to shake up and settle down, to use your phrase, Walter, and look back 
in some years. I think it will have more impact from an historical view taen. 
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TR - Would there be anything wrong with having a couple of us, maybe a 
Republican and a Democrat, working together as a kind of subcommittee, 
explore alternatives, and then report to the group without making an:, 
kind of judgment or decision? I would be willing and glad to do that 
- just see what is available. 
HF - Like Bill, I entertained the idea of a book, and I thin.i<, Father, you saw 
some chapters by the author. I think we need an author for a discipline, 
he is going to know a lot we don't know, he is going to have to decide 
on a focus, where you start the book, how do you make it interesting -
the things that are part of his knowledge and not ours. Finally, I would 
like to say I do think the author should be somebody, if we go that 
route, like Naughton or Lucas or Waldman - someone very close to the 
proceedings. You cannot separate the evolution of our decision, personal 
decisions, from the context of the committee activities. You have to 
know what was newsworthy, what happened, what were the major events from 
October, '73 thru the summer of '74• 
D.5 - Have all of you seen the best seller by Merle Miller, Plain Sneaking, 
about or really by Truman? That I think has real possibilities for a 
group like this. I think just another book, written by a secondary 
author, and he could be the best guy in the world, is just another book. 
But if it were done in a sense by you seven, largely a series of quota-
tions from Thornton and Mann and so forth in whatever format you and 
a really good author-editor would agree, so the "author" would actually 
be the seven congressmen, with, of course, a sophicated editor. 
Then you've got something distinctive. And it would be a primary 
historical som-ce - not about but by the actors. 
WF - Right, not another chronology of the thil"'.g. I don't think it would be 
sexy enough to sell, as justanothe~ account. 
JM - I think it ought to be polished up as a historical document a.~d it will 
take us a year to do it, based on what we have already. As Tom suggests, 
the individual chronology from the beginning to the 23rd of July, '74, 
and then a good narrative based on our interview, which might be an ap-
pendix, for that matter, and put it together as a historical document 
with no idea at all as to doing anything further with it. However, it 
will be the basis for a secondary author to do what Ham has suggested -
intertwine it with the whole story in due course, whenever that might be. 
But to polish it up now as a historical document is important. 
CB - Now with all due respects, I don't think you have done everything that I 
would be led to think you will do. Now I had thought when you got thru 
here you were going to take your staff .and put all of this together, into 
what you call a historical document. 
TM - We just can't do that. 
., 
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CB - Well, we are a. long ways from that at this moment, that I would say. 
DS - What do you consider should comprise our report, ~ .. you want to use that 
term? To what extent, at this stage, should we t:-y to pull it all together? ~ 
CB - Well, I should think that it could be, with all d-ce resepct to John1 Doar, 
something of the sort of report that he put together. 
TR - All of us, I guess, have thought of doing someth::..ng. 
CB - WAyne Wood.lief, who is a reporter for the Landmark Publications, and 
was not . covering Watergate and our inquiry, sat do-an with me one or two 
nights a week beginning some time in March, and that is why 'f1I1' notes are 
a little bit more extensive than others. I would dictate him memoranda 
of my impressions. We didn't try to organize too well, just kind of get 
it off the top of your head before you forgot it. That is pretty ex-
tensive. He tried to put it together in a book, and looked around a little 
bit, and we decided it wouldn't sell. I mention that to you because he's 
interested in writing, and I think he's entitled to be consulted. My 
view of what we really ought to do is pretty much of a joint-idea. Is 
your suggestion to put it together factually, ste~~ized historical docu-
ments, with no worry about transitional devices, ~ournalistic perfection, 
or anything, and then undertake to get somebody .ho would pull it to-
gether in the appropraite way? I think the only way we could do that is 
select from our group one or two people who would ce our agents, or our 
spokesmen, and let them make the decisions, and we would just be burdened 
with them or abide with them, as the case might c~. 
TR - No, I don't think you have to go that far. I don't see where we lose 
having a couple of us just inquire, ask them what they thin.'lc about it 
and if we think something sounds interesting or they sound interested, 
then have a meeting with the whole group and let~ publisher or an agent 
meet with the whole group. That is all I'm saying. 
CB - I think contrary to what some people here seem to be saying, tr.is is an 
omitted portion of history. The second thing is that I thin .. 1< it would 
be ver<J interesting to read. As a matter of fact I was thinking yesterday, 
all we need to do is take our transcript of this, clean it up a bit, 
and it would make a very interesting radio program, or anything else. 
I just think theee would be interest in it and that it would sell. It 
wouldn't make millionaires out of anybody, but I think it would move on 
the publishing world, because that trash that Breslin has put out sells. 
So this sort of thing, which is a little more accurate, surely should. 
DS - I think that the important thing is to keep it essentially a primary source, 
so that no one in the future can say it is anything other than your ideas 
and recollections and words. Once it is my words, it's screwed up. 
CB - That is the purity of oral history that you are talking about. I suggest 
then that we at least start there. 
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